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Abstract
We consider an industry where an upstream rm determines the size of a network
used by two downstream rms. We contrast ownership unbundling and legal
unbundling, where the upstream rm maximizes its total prot, including the
prot of its downstream subsidiary(ies), but does not discriminate between them.
Furthermore, each downstream subsidiary maximizes its own prot. We show
that ownership separation is more detrimental to welfare than legal unbundling,
whether the downstream market is perfectly competitive or not, and whether
there are asymmetries in network needs across downstream rms, and downstream
investments, or not.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the impact of legal unbundling vs ownership unbundling
on the incentives of a network operator to invest. We consider an industry
where the upstream firm invests in and maintains a network, while several
downstream firms compete in selling goods and services that use this network
as a necessary input (i.e., no bypass technology is available, at least at an
economically relevant price1). Many network industries fit this description,
including telecommunications, railways, electricity, postal sector, natural gas,
etc.
There are many papers in the regulation, industrial economics and eco-
nomics of organizations literature that study the impact of various ownership
structures in network industries. The simplest such structure is one in which
an upstream firm provides an input to a downstream firm. These papers of-
ten compare the behavior of a vertically integrated firm with the equilibrium
situation where the upstream and downstream activities are undertaken by
separate firms (i.e., firms whose ownership differ from one another).2
There are two types of considerations that might induce the upstream
and downstream firms to merge. First, they might want to use the combined
weight of the two firms for strategic purposes. For instance, when the upstream
firm has market power in the supply of the input, but the downstream firm
faces competition, the merger can be a way to prevent a form of “trickling up”
effect of competition. We will call this view the “antitrust perspective”, as it is
the fear of this type of consequences that prompts competition authorities to
disallow some mergers. Second, there might be some efficiency gains to running
the two firms as a single unit, and the aim of the merger is to take advantage of
these efficiency gains. This type of merger can arise in a competitive market,
whereas the first type could not. To stress the fact that authors who write on
this topic are interested in the internal functioning of the firm, we will label
this branch of the literature the “managerial perspective”
In this paper, we consider a situation with one upstream firm and
two competing downstream firms. Regulatory practice has typically analyzed
the ownership of a downstream firm by the upstream firm in the antitrust
perspective and with suspicion: this ownership is seen as an open door to
anti-competitive discrimination; we think that it is fair to say that regulators
have often accepted vertical integration as a political compromise. The aim of
this paper is to begin exploring what the managerial perspective can bring to
1We relax this assumption in section 6.
2See for instance the seminal paper by Vickers (1995) or the more recent one by Brito et
al. (2010) and the references therein.
the debate.
What the managerial perspective calls vertical disintegration corre-
sponds to the ownership unbundling scenario that we study in the current
paper. There also exists an intermediate (between integration and full divesti-
ture) form of unbundling, often called legal unbundling. This corresponds to
the situation where the upstream and one or many downstream firms belong
to the same owners and where these owners, although they are the residual
claimants over the financial returns generated by the firms’ assets (i.e., they
keep the firms’s profits), do not have the full control rights over the firms’
decisions.
Legal unbundling appears for instance in several European directives on
network industries. For instance, the 2003/55 European Directive on natural
gas states “In order to ensure efficient and non-discriminatory network access
it is appropriate that the transmission and distribution systems are operated
through legally separate entities where vertically integrated undertakings exist.
It is important however to distinguish between such legal separation and own-
ership unbundling. Legal separation implies neither a change of ownership of
assets [. . . ]. However, a non-discriminatory decision-making process should be
ensured through organizational measures regarding the independence of the
decision-makers responsible.” The Directive especially stresses the indepen-
dence of the upstream firm (called the “transmission system operator”) from
“day to day operation of the production, distribution and supply of natural
gas”.3
While it is clear how ownership unbundling can guarantee the inde-
pendence of decisions between upstream and downstream firms, it is far less
clear how to model the objective functions of these two types of firms in the
case of legal unbundling. We proceed as follows. We consider a sequential
game where the upstream firm first chooses the size of its network, and where
two downstream firms then compete by selling goods that use this network as
an essential input. We contrast the (socially) optimal allocation with several
equilibrium situations, depending on the ownership structure in the indus-
3The more recent 2009/73/EC Directive, which repeals 2003/55, takes a dimmer view
of legal unbundling (stating in its Whereas (7) that “The rules on legal and functional
unbundling as provided for in Directive 2003/55/EC have not, however, led to effective un-
bundling of the transmission system operators”), but falls short of imposing full ownership
unbundling. Rather, it states in its Whereas (13) that “the setting up of a system oper-
ator or a transmission operator that is independent from supply and production interests
should enable a vertically integrated undertaking to maintain its ownership of network as-
sets whilst ensuring an effective separation of interests” and that “Member States should
therefore be given a choice between ownership unbundling and setting up a system operator
or transmission operator which is independent from supply and production interests.”
try. More precisely, we consider the market equilibria when the upstream firm
owns zero, one or two downstream firms. The first situation corresponds to
ownership unbundling between upstream and downstream parts of the mar-
ket. As for the other two cases, we equate legal unbundling with the following
two assumptions. First, each downstream firm maximizes its own profit, with-
out taking into account any impact on the upstream firm’s profit. Second,
the upstream firm is not allowed to discriminate between downstream firms
by charging different access charges for the use of its network. On the other
hand, we assume that the upstream firm chooses its network size in order to
maximize its total profit, including the profit of its downstream subsidiaries.
Our modeling choice for legal unbundling and for regulation needs to
be explained at this stage. We assume that legal unbundling is effective in en-
suring that the upstream firm does not use its power to favor its downstream
affiliate(s), and thus promotes competition downstream among the firms us-
ing the network to provide final goods and services. We then abstract from
the discrimination/sabotage concerns studied by the antitrust literature. At
the same time, it appears to us much more difficult to ensure that network
investments do not take into account the profit of the whole group in case
of legal unbundling.4 In other words, we take a long-term perspective where
the lack of downstream competition and the ability of the upstream firm to
discriminate between downstream firms have been solved by the requirement
of legal unbundling, and we concentrate on the way legal unbundling may
distort the network investment decisions. This view explains the absence of
explicit regulation in our setting, where the access charge is not regulated, but
set endogenously at the market-clearing level once the network size has been
chosen. This may not correspond to the practice in most network industries,
where the regulator often affects the level of the access charges.5 We rather
look at the objectives of regulators (absence of downstream discrimination and
downstream competition), and we focus on the best case scenario where they
are satisfied so that we concentrate on studying how ownership arrangements
affect investment incentives in this environment.
With ownership unbundling, the upstream firm sets a lower-than-optimal
network level in order to increase the equilibrium access charge and maximize
4If network investment were also taken independently, so that they maximized only the
upstream profit, there would be no difference between vertical separation and unbundling
in our setting.
5Although there are exceptions, such as the UK postal sector, the energy market in
Germany in the beginning of the 2000s, or natural gas storage facilities in the European
Directive, where access charges are negotiated between the owner of the network and firms
demanding access to it.
its profit. With legal unbundling, the upstream firm takes into account down-
stream profits as well. If these profits are increasing in network size, legal
unbundling then mitigates the incentive of the upstream firm to invest too
little in the network.6 In order to show this, we present four different models.
After introducing our general framework in section 2, in section 3 we explore
the strategies of the firms when the two downstream firms face the same cost
functions, use the network with the same intensity and are price takers on the
market for the final output (on which they sell their production). Section 4
revisits the same model assuming that the firms have the same “non-network”
cost function, but have different network utilization requirements. In section 5,
we relax the assumption that the downstreammarket is competitive. Section 6
assumes that the downstream firms can make some investments that reduce
their use of the network at given output. This may be interpreted, for instance,
as investing in bypass activities. In all these cases, we obtain the same results:
disallowing joint ownership of network and downstream facilities reduces the
investment in the network. The conclusion, section 7, discusses the limits of
our work and the extensions that would be necessary for a more complete
comparison of legal and ownership unbundling.
We would like to stress that our objective is to highlight one specific
aspect of the comparison between ownership and legal separation, namely its
impact on the incentives to invest in the network. We certainly do not claim
that integration is always better than separation, but only that this particular
effect should be taken into account by policy makers when assessing the pros
and cons of the various ownership arrangements.
Before moving to the model, we mention briefly the related literature.
Related literature
Our paper is related to different strands of literature, including the ones on
vertical integration and separation (see footnote 2 above), the role of owner-
ship in the theory of the firm (see Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Gross-
man and Hart (1986)), and the regulation of infrastructure (see the review by
Guthrie (2006) and the references therein, as well as Buehler et al.(2004) for
a comparison of the network provider’s incentives to invest in infrastructure
quality under vertical integration and separation). Due to space constraints,
6The linearity of the access charge is crucial to our results, since a non-linear access
charge (such as a two-part tariff) would allow the usptream firm to capture all downstream
profits at no efficiency cost, whatever the ownership arrangement. In other words, the
inefficiency comes from the fact that downstream firms base their decisions on the distorted
linear access charge, rather than the true marginal cost of access.
we concentrate in this section on the emerging literature dealing with legal
separation. These papers differ in the way they model legal unbundling.
Sibley and Weisman (1998) examine the situation where a regulated
upstream firm provides an input to firms in the downstreammarket. The paper
derives numerical conditions under which the upstream monopoly entering the
downstream market has no incentive to discriminate against its downstream
competitors, because it would hurt the selling of access more than it would
benefit its subsidiary. What qualifies this paper as a member of the legal
separation literature is its second part, where it studies and compares two ways
to condition the monopoly’s entry into the downstream market: with a “fully
separated subsidiary” maximizing its own profit and buying the input at the
same price as its downstream rivals, or as a fully integrated firm maximizing
total profits and subject to an imputed price floor in the downstream market.
The paper shows that no solution always dominates the other in terms of
incentives to discriminate.
Bolle and Breitmoser (2006) posit that regulation is less effective with
legal than ownership unbundling (because of the profit transfers that are possi-
ble between upstream and downstream firms under legal unbundling), but that
legal unbundling solves the double marginalization problem associated with
ownership unbundling. The paper then studies under what circumstances this
trade-off results in a lower price for consumers under legal unbundling. van
Koten (2008) studies electricity markets where auctions are used and shows
that, even if legal unbundling is successful in preventing discriminatory treat-
ment of buyers, it may nevertheless result in distorted bidding incentives,
leading the integrated buyer to be more aggressive than with ownership un-
bundling (because, even if the legally unbundled seller can be restricted to
maximize its own profit, the buyer can be instructed by the holding company
to maximize total joint profits). The three papers closer to ours are Höffler
and Kranz (2011a, b) and Fiocco (2011). Like us, they model a market with
one firm upstream and several downstream. In their setting, contrary to ours,
one downstream firm owns the upstream firm. Höffler and Kranz (2011a, b)
assume that the regulator cannot prevent the upstream firm from using non-
tariff discrimination in favor of its parent. They study and compare market
equilibria when the access charge has been exogenously set by a regulator.
Höffler and Kranz (2011a) study perfect legal unbundling, where the down-
stream firm maximizes joint profits while the upstream firm maximizes its own
profit. They show that legal unbundling never yields lower quantities in the
downstream market than ownership separation and integration. Höffler and
Kranz (2011b) study imperfect legal unbundling, where the upstream firm is
biased and also takes part of the downstream firm’s profit under consideration.
They show how the extent of this bias affects total output, and how the bias
can be endogenized as a function of ownership shares. Fiocco (2011) studies
the optimal (regulated) access charge under asymmetric information regard-
ing the upstream cost. In that setting, legal unbundling looks very much alike
vertical integration (both the downstream incumbent and its upstream sub-
sidiary maximize their joint profit), except that the regulator has to guarantee
non negative profits to both firms under legal unbundling. The author shows
that legal unbundling may dominate ownership separation because it creates
countervailing incentives within the vertical group to strategically use its infor-
mation. The current paper differs from this literature mainly by abstracting
from discrimination and sabotage considerations.
2 The model
Consider an industry where one firm (referred to as “upstream”, indexed by
) is in charge of building and maintaining a network, while two firms (“down-
stream”, indexed by  = 1 2) sell goods or services that use the network. The
upstream firm chooses the size  of the network it builds and maintains. The
(constant) per-unit cost of the network is denoted by , so that its total cost is
 = . Downstream firm  sells  units of its product at price . Production
technology is such that each unit of good  uses one unit of network: there is
no bypass technology available at an economically relevant cost, so that the
network is an essential facility. In addition to network costs, both downstream
firms have the same (non network related) cost function (). We assume
that the downstream technology shows decreasing returns to scale, so that
 0()  0 and  00()  0 .7 To ensure concavity of the profit functions,
we will also often assume that  000() is positive. As for the network costs,
downstream firms pay to the upstream firm a constant access charge  (that
is endogenous in our model, and not set by a regulator) for each unit of the
network that they use.
The products sold by both downstream firms are perfect substitutes.8
Let  denote the total quantity in the downstream market, so that  =
1+2. We denote by() the aggregate demand for the downstream product,
and by () the aggregate inverse demand. We assume that the revenue
7This assumption guarantees that competitive downstream firms earn a positive profit,
which is crucial to our argument. This assumption is relaxed in section 5 where we introduce
imperfect downstream competition.
8This assumption is not crucial: our results would carry through if the downstream goods
were sold on totally separate, unrelated markets or if they were imperfect substitutes.
functions () and () are concave. We denote by  the upstream
firm’s profit and by  downstream firm ’s profit.
Wemodel the following sequential game: first, the upstream firm chooses
the size of the network and then the downstream firms compete. This tim-
ing is natural given the nature of the decisions involved. We solve this game
for various scenarios concerning the downstream competitive conditions and
the symmetry between downstream firms. In Sections 3, 4 and 6, we assume
that the downstream firms are perfectly competitive (price takers). Conse-
quently, they choose their output level to equate marginal cost and market
price. Section 3 is concerned with the case where both downstream firms are
symmetrical: they share the same downstream cost function and have the
same needs in terms of network usage. Section 4 considers the case where the
network is more adapted to one of the downstream firms than to the other,
while the non network related cost functions of the two downstream firms are
the same. Section 6 analyzes the impact of allowing downstream firms to also
make investments that would allow them to decrease their need of network us-
age for any given output level. Section 5 lifts the assumption that downstream
firms are pure price takers but rather assumes that they have market power
and play a Cournot game.
We proceed similarly in Sections 3 to 6. We first study the surplus-
maximizing allocation. We then solve the model by backward induction, start-
ing with the downstream equilibrium, to obtain prices (including the access
charge) and quantities as a function of the network size. We then study the
equilibrium choice by the upstream firm of the network size as a function of the
ownership structure. Under ownership separation, firm  chooses the network
size  that maximizes  , anticipating downstream firms’ reactions. Under
legal separation, firm  chooses the network size  that maximizes  + 
if it owns only downstream firm , and  + 1 + 2 if it owns both.9 In
both cases, downstream firms maximize their own profit. Recall that legal
separation prevents the upstream firm from taking downstream decisions di-
rectly. Our objective is to assess how legal and ownership unbundling affect
the equilibrium network size.10
9This is a specific way to model legal unbundling. Other approaches are possible and
might lead to other results. For instance one could assume that it’s the downstream firm
which maximizes total profits while the upstream firm is only concerned with its own profit.
10The upstream firm, by choosing the network size, determines the final quantity. This
implies (as long as social surplus is increasing in quantity below the efficient level) that larger
investments yield higher social surplus. Observe that the upstream firm also determines the
access charge that clears the market for capacity.
3 Symmetric Equilibria
We begin by studying the outputs that would be chosen by a welfare-maximizing
planner before turning to the analysis of the game between the firms.
3.1 Social Optimum
The social optimum is the allocation that maximizes total surplus  in the
economy. Assuming quasi-linear preferences for consumers of the downstream
products, total surplus is equal to consumers gross surplus minus upstream
and downstream costs. The social planner chooses a network size  that solves
max  =
Z 
0
()− 2
µ 
2
¶
− 
Denote the optimal level of variables by a ∗. The solution is given by ∗1 =∗2 = ∗2 where ∗ = ∗ is defined by
(∗) =  0
µ∗
2
¶
+  =  0(∗ ) +  (1)
This condition is easy to interpret; it requires marginal cost to equal
marginal willingness to pay for the final good. The marginal cost is equal to
the sum of marginal upstream and downstream costs. Further, observe that,
at the optimum, the marginal cost is the same for both firms.11 The optimal
network size equals the volume of goods sold at this optimal price.
3.2 Equilibrium
In the remainder of this section, we shall study different ownership structures.
For all of them, once the size of the network has been chosen, the downstream
firms act as price-takers. Solving the game by backward induction, we first
study the prices which will prevail given a choice of a network size .
Because the downstream firms are price-takers, they consider both the
market price  of their output and the network access  as given. Consequently,
they choose their output in order to equalize their marginal cost with the
market price :
 =  0() +  (2)
11This will hold true also when we introduce an asymmetry between the downstream
firms. In other words, productive efficiency is necessary for social optimality.
Their total production will be (), which is equal to their total demand for
the services of the network since equilibrium on the network input market
requires
() =  (3)
Given a size  chosen for the network in the first stage of the game, equations (2)
and (3) simultaneously determine the access charge  and the downstream price
 (and therefore also the quantity sold ) as functions of ; we denote these
functions by ˜() and12 ˜() = (): they denote the prices that will prevail as
a function of the choice of .
We now turn to the capacity decision by the upstream firm whose profit
is given by
 = e() − 
while the profit functions of the two downstream firms, 1 and 2, are
 =  (e()) [e()− e()]−  ((e()))   = 1 2
where ˜() and ˜() are the solutions to equations (2) and (3).
Observe that firm  has some market power, since it anticipates the
equilibrium downstream prices (access charge  and final price ) induced by its
choice of . Further, the assumption that  00()  0 means that downstream
firms make a positive profit even when they act as price takers.
We introduce the following notation to compare the various scenarios
studied. We use the superscript 2 to index the equilibrium levels of the
different variables when the upstream firm owns the two downstream firms,
the superscript 1 when it owns only one, and the superscript 0 when it owns
none (the ownership unbundling scenario).
The proof of the following proposition is provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 Assume that downstream firms are symmetrical. Then
(a) The equilibrium when the upstream firm owns both downstream firms while
subject to legal unbundling is the same as the one with vertical integration;
(b) We have
0  1  2  ∗
12Notice the difference: () represents the price at which consumers will choose to con-
sume  units of the final good whereas ˜() represents the price which will prevail if  units
of network services are provided. In the model of this section, they are equal; with other
technology of productions they need not be.
The scenario of legal unbundling (where  chooses the network size
to maximize the sum of upstream and of both downstream profits) differs
from the classical vertical integration case because the upstream firm  does
not control the pricing policy of the two downstream firms. In other words,
the managers of the downstream firms maximize their profit given the market
price. Proposition 1 (a) shows that we nevertheless obtain the same allocation
in both cases. In both cases, the upstream firm chooses the network size (and
thus the total retail output) to equalize marginal revenue and marginal cost,
with marginal cost being the sum of the downstream marginal cost  0 and of
the upstream marginal cost , rather than the access charge paid by the down-
stream firm. In other words, when setting its network size, the upstream firm
understands that the access charge is a pure transfer between its subsidiary
and itself.
We now move to the comparison of the equilibrium allocation in that
case with the socially optimal one. Proposition 1 (b) shows that the equilib-
rium network size is lower than socially optimal with legal unbundling (2  ∗)
so that the equilibrium retail price is larger than optimal (2  ∗). Intu-
itively, the upstream firm chooses a lower-than-optimal network size in order to
reduce the downstream output level and to increase downstream profits. This
result holds even with legal unbundling between downstream and upstream
firms —i.e., even when managers of the downstream firms do not take into ac-
count the profits of the upstream firm when they set their profit-maximizing
prices.
Proposition 1 (b) shows that the underprovision of network is even
larger with ownership unbundling (0  2  ∗): the fact that the upstream
firm does not share in the downstream profits induces it to further decrease
 and , compared to the legal unbundling situation. Ownership unbundling
is thus more detrimental to welfare than legal unbundling in our setting. The
driver for this result is the assumption of decreasing returns to scale. With
 00  0, downstream profits (which equal  0() − () because of price-
taking behavior on the downstream market) are not only positive but also
increasing in  = 2. The upstream firm does not capture these downstream
profits with ownership unbundling, unlike with legal unbundling. This in turn
means that increasing the network size is less attractive for the upstream firm
under ownership separation, leading to 0  2.
Finally, the scenario 1 (where the upstream firm owns one downstream
firm) gives a profit-maximizing size of the network that is intermediate between
scenarios 0 (ownership separation) and 2 ( owns both downstream firms).
This results is straightforward since the objective function of  under 1 is a
convex combination of the objectives under 0 and 2:
 +  = 1
2
( + 1 + 2) + 1
2
   = 1 2
To summarize, we have established that the incentives for the proper de-
termination of the network size increase with the number of downstream firms
that the upstream firm owns. The main driver for this result is the decreasing
returns to scale on the downstream market, which ensure that downstream
profits (not captured by firm  under ownership separation) are increasing
in network size. As the upstream firm acquires more downstream firms, its
incentives to invest in the network increase, and the equilibrium network size
increases toward the optimal level. Observe that we have assumed throughout
the analysis that legal unbundling prevails in the absence of ownership un-
bundling. We have also obtained that, with legal unbundling, the equilibrium
network size when the upstream firm owns both downstream firms falls short
of the optimal network size.
4 Downstream firms’ asymmetry
We now introduce some asymmetry between downstream firms, in the form of
different needs in terms of network access. We assume that the investments
made in the network by the upstream firm benefit more one firm than the other.
For instance, in the natural gas sector, this situation could arise because of
the localization of the investments (new pipelines built in a region where one
downstream firm has a larger share of its customers’ portfolio than the other
firm) or their type (investing in LNG rather than pipelines for instance). The
objective in this section is to understand how the existence of such asymmetries
affects the optimal and equilibrium size of the network, and how it relates with
legal and ownership unbundling.
We model asymmetry in network needs as follows. We assume that
downstream firm 1 benefits more than downstream firm 2 from investments
in the network: firm 1 needs only (1 − ) unit of network for each unit of
final good that it sells. On the other hand, downstream firm 2 needs one unit
of network use for each unit of final good sold, as previously. The parameter
 ∈ [0 1[ measures the intensity of the additional benefit that firm 1 gets
from the network. We assume that this parameter  is set exogenously (given
by the technology, for instance). An extension to our analysis would be to
endogenize the setting of this parameter by letting the upstream firm choose
its profit-maximizing level.
Except for the introduction of the parameter , we maintain all the
assumptions made in the previous section. We proceed as in the previous sec-
tion by looking first at the optimal allocation before turning to the equilibrium
allocations in the various unbundling scenarios.
4.1 Social Optimum
The social planner’s optimization program is
max12
 =
Z 1+2
0
()− (1)− (2)− [(1− )1 + 2]
yielding the following first-order conditions
(1 + 2) =  0(1) + (1− )
(1 + 2) =  0(2) + 
These are the usual conditions that price should equal marginal costs. To-
gether, they imply that
 0(∗1) + (1− ) =  0(∗2) + 
i.e., that we have productive efficiency at the optimum.
The first-order conditions allow us to obtain the optimal downstream
quantities and network size, which we denote as previously with a ∗: ∗1 ∗2
and ∗ = (1− )∗1 + ∗2
4.2 Equilibrium
As in section 3, we need to compute the equilibrium of the game played by
the downstream firms as a function of .
Competition in the downstream market generates the following equi-
librium conditions, which replace (2) and (3):
 =  0(1) + (1− ) (4)
 =  0(2) +  (5)
 = (1− )1 + 2 (6)
() = 1 + 2 (7)
The solution to these four simultaneous equations yields the equilibrium levels
of the access charge, retail price and downstream quantities as functions of the
network size and the parameter . Given that  is treated as exogenous in
this section, we denote these relationships by e() e1() e2() and
e() = (e1() + e2()) (8)
Observe that, unlike in the earlier section, we now have that e() 6= () since
 6= 1 + 2
We make use of the equilibrium quantities and price in the downstream
markets to obtain the profit levels of the three operators as a function of the
network size:
 = e() − 
1 = e1() [e()− (1− )e()]−  (e1()) 
2 = e2() [e()− e()]−  (e2()) 
When comparing the allocations under the various ownership scenarios,
we now have to distinguish between the case where the upstream firm owns
the downstream firm 1 (denoted by 11) and the case where  owns firm 2
(denoted by 12). The proof of the following proposition is provided in the
Appendix.
Proposition 2 Assume that downstream firms are asymmetrical in their net-
work needs. Then
(a) The equilibrium when the upstream firm owns both downstream firms while
subject to legal unbundling differs from the one with vertical integration;
(b) Legal unbundling results in production inefficiency;
(c) We have
0  11  2 and 0  12  2
Under scenario 2, the upstream firm maximizes total profit by equat-
ing the marginal revenue of increasing downstream output with the relevant
marginal cost (see equation (A9) in the Appendix). The relevant marginal
non-network cost is a convex combination of the two marginal non-network
costs, with the weight put on any firm ’s marginal cost equal to the proportion
that this firm’s additional output represents in the total additional downstream
output when the network size is increased: e0()(e01()+ e02()). The marginal
network cost of downstream units is now smaller than , since firm 1’s out-
put uses less than one unit of network. This stands in stark contrast with
the profit-maximizing condition for a vertically integrated monopoly, which
equates separately marginal revenue with the marginal cost of each of the two
downstream firms.
This means that, while under symmetry legal separation and full in-
tegration yielded the same outcome, this is no longer true here. Under legal
unbundling with asymmetric downstream firms, the upstream firm does not
have enough instruments to achieve the integrated solution; setting the net-
work size is not longer sufficient to have full control.
Also, while under vertical integration productive efficiency is main-
tained by the fully integrated firm (since marginal costs are the same at equi-
librium for the two downstream operators), there is no mechanism to equalize
these marginal costs in the case of legal separation. Consequently, legal un-
bundling will result in production inefficiency under asymmetry.
Part (c) of Proposition 2 shows that the intuition obtained in section 3
carries over to the case of asymmetric downstream cost functions: with own-
ership unbundling, the upstream firm fails to take into account downstream
profits, with the difference between upstream and downstream profit levels in-
creasing with downstream volumes. The upstream firm has then an incentive
to invest less in its network than in the case where it owns the two downstream
firms: 0  2. Moreover, this also explains why the network size when the
upstream firm owns one downstream firm is larger than with ownership sepa-
ration but smaller than when the upstream firm owns both downstream firms.
The general conclusion that we draw from this section is that the rel-
ative ranking of the equilibrium network sizes is robust to the introduction of
asymmetry between downstream firms. With such an asymmetry, ownership
unbundling leads to more under-investment than legal unbundling: the more
integrated the industry, the closer the equilibrium network size to its optimal
level.
We now study the robustness of our results to the introduction of im-
perfect competition in the downstream market.
5 Imperfect competition in the downstream
market
In this section, we assume that both downstream firms compete à la Cournot
on the final market. We maintain the assumption that the products they
offer are perfect substitutes. We retain the assumption that they are totally
symmetric: they have the same cost function and require the same use of the
network. We further assume that the downstream cost function is linear, with
() = . Finally, we assume that the downstream firms act as price takers
in their purchase of network services.
5.1 Social Optimum
The social planner’s objective is to
max  =
Z 
0
()−  − 
The solution ∗ = ∗ to this problem is defined by
(∗) = +  (9)
This is the usual condition that marginal willingness to pay should equal mar-
ginal cost. Since the (constant) marginal cost is the same for both downstream
firms, the socially optimal allocation is concerned with the total downstream
quantities and not with the individual quantities sold by each firm.
5.2 Equilibrium in the downstream market
With Cournot competition, each downstream firm chooses its output level 
in order to maximize
 = ( + )−  − 
=  [( + )− − ] 
given the output level  supplied by its competitor . The fact that firm 
acts as a price taker in the market for network services implies that it takes
the access charge  as given, and independent of its own demand for these
services.
The first-order condition for downstream profit maximization is
 = ( + )− − −0( + )  (10)
Equation (10) together with the condition () =  determine as previously
the access charge and retail price as a function of network size. These rela-
tionships are denoted by ˜() and ˜() = ()
The symmetry between the two firms together with the equilibrium
condition on the market for input  imply that both firms choose the same
output in equilibrium
1 = 2 = 2
This relationship allows us to simplify equation (10) to obtain
˜() = + − 
2
˜0() (11)
with ˜0()  0.
The intuition for this result is that each firm sells its product at a
price larger than its marginal cost  + , with the mark-up being inversely
proportional to (half) the demand-price elasticity of output.
We now proceed to study equilibrium network size under various in-
tegration scenarios, and we obtain the following proposition (proved in the
Appendix).
Proposition 3 Assume that downstream firms compete à la Cournot. Then,
we have that
0  1  2  ∗
The intuition for why the network size under legal separation with two
subsidiaries is lower than optimal (2  ∗) is the same as previously: the
upstream firm under-invests in the network in order to decrease downstream
quantities and increase downstream prices. The main difference with the pre-
vious sections lies in the fact the downstream firms make a profit because of
imperfect competition, not because returns to scale are decreasing.
We also obtain that the underprovision of network is even larger with
ownership unbundling (0  2): as in previous sections, the upstream firm
not sharing in the downstream profits induces it to further decrease , compared
to the legal unbundling situation, because downstream profit is increasing
in network size. Although the result is the same, the mechanism that links
network size with downstream profit differs. It is now due to the product of
network size (or total downstream quantity) by downstream mark-up (equal
to ˜0()2 by equation (11)) being increasing in , thanks to the second-order
condition for (total) profit maximization by the upstream firm. In other words,
the reason why the downstream profit increases with the network size depends
on the downstream cost structure and competitive situation: under perfect
competition, it is due to the (assumed) convexity of costs while under imperfect
competition, it is due to the variation in the downstream mark-up.
Finally, if the upstream firm owns one of the downstream firms, one
can replicate the argument mentioned in section 3: the constraints faced are
the same in the cases where the upstream firm owns zero, one and two down-
stream firms, while the objective in the case 1 is a convex combination of the
objectives in the scenarios 0 and 2.
We then obtain that, provided that the profit functions are concave in
,
0  1  2  ∗
We then conclude from this section that the ranking of network sizes
according to the number of downstream firms owned by the upstream firm is
robust to the introduction of imperfect competition in the downstreammarket.
6 Investments by the downstream firms
We now study the robustness of our results to the introduction of a second
decision by the downstream firms, beyond the setting of their prices. This
decision is how much to invest in an activity that, although costly by itself,
allows the downstream firm to economize on its network usage for any given
level of output. One example of such an investment would be, in the natural gas
market, for the downstream firms to offer to final clients interruptible contracts
or alternatively to buy insurance to cover risks such as transport congestion
due to a peak demand. These two types of contracts are obviously costly
for the downstream firm (in the first case because they decrease its output
price, in the second because of the direct outlays they represent) but allow it
to decrease its needs in terms of network usage for any level of output sold
to clients. Alternatively, these investments can be seen as bypass activities,
decreasing the need for access to the network at the expense of other, non-
network, costs.
We maintain the assumption of legal unbundling throughout the analy-
sis, so that the upstream firm cannot control the investment decisions of its
downstream subsidiaries. We model this extension to downstream investments
as follows. The profit of downstream firm  is given by
 =  − ()− () − 
where  measures the per-unit of output amount of investment made by firm
, and () the resulting network needs of firm  by unit of output. We have
that (0) = 1 and that 0()  0. Also, as above, the non-network cost
function  is convex, with  000  0.
6.1 Social Optimum
The social planner chooses the network size  and the downstream investment
that solve the problem
max  =
Z 
0
()− 2
µ 
2()
¶
− () − 
with  = ()
Denoting the optimal level of variables by a ∗ as previously, the first-
order condition with respect to network size is
∗ = (∗) =  0
µ∗
2
¶
+  + () (12)
i.e., marginal willingness to pay should equal social marginal cost. With con-
stant marginal costs, the social optimum determines total downstream output
but not how much is produced by firm 1 or firm 2. For later use, we express
condition (12) in terms of mark-up over the marginal non network cost:
∗ −  0
µ∗
2
¶
=  + () (13)
The first-order condition with respect to downstream investment is
0(∗) = −1 (14)
Both firms should invest the same per-unit of output amount, which equalizes
marginal benefit and marginal cost per unit of output.
6.2 Equilibrium in the downstream market
The two downstream firms, which are price takers both on the downstream
market and on the market for the network input, simultaneously choose their
profit-maximizing levels of investment, . Using the symmetry between down-
stream firms, the first-order condition for  is
0() = −1 (15)
which is very intuitive, since it calls for equalization of the monetary marginal
benefit from the investment with its marginal cost.
The price-taking behavior of downstream firms implies
 =  0
µ()
2
¶
+ () +  (16)
i.e., that the equilibrium price equals total marginal cost for the downstream
firms.
Equilibrium on the input  market implies
()() =  (17)
Equations (15) to (17) simultaneously determine the access charge ,
the downstream price  and the amount of downstream investment  (and
thus also ) as functions of . We denote these functions by ˜() ˜() and
˜() Observe that, as in section 4, ˜() 6= () because  6=  = 1 + 2
The following proposition, whose proof is provided in the Appendix,
characterizes the equilibrium as a function of the ownership scenario.
Proposition 4 Assume that downstream firms also proceed to downstream
investments. Then, we have that
(a) The mark-up over the non-network cost is larger than socially optimal with
legal separation and two downstream subsidiaries;
(b) We have
0  1  2
if ˜0()  0
The mark-up over the non-network cost when the upstream firm owns
the downstream firms (2 scenario) is socially too large for two reasons (see
equation (A19) in the Appendix). The first one is the inclusion in the 2
mark-up of the usual marginal revenue term, since the upstream firm takes
into account how the final price is affected by its network size decision when
maximizing its profit. The other component of the 2 mark-up is the (per
unit of output) network cost, including the investment cost. It is larger than
socially optimal as soon as the access charge  differs from the marginal cost of
the network  because downstream firms’ investment decisions minimize their
network cost using the former rather than the latter (compare (15) with (14)).
Both effects drive the equilibrium 2 mark-up above its socially optimal level.
In section 3, the observation that the mark-up over non-network mar-
ginal cost  0 was larger in the 2 scenario than its optimal level was enough to
deduce that 2  ∗ and ∗  2. This is not sufficient in the framework of this
section, since such comparisons also depend on the comparison between 2
and the socially optimal downstream investment level ∗. This comparison
in turn hinges on whether the access charge  is larger or smaller than the
network marginal cost . Observe that, with legal unbundling, the upstream
firm cannot control the pricing decisions of its downstream subsidiaries. In
the absence of downstream investment, the upstream firm induces a positive
mark-up on the downstream market by decreasing the size of its network and
at the same time increasing the (market clearing) access charge , so that
  . Introducing downstream investment, we obtain that a further effect
of increasing  above  is to induce the downstream firm to invest more than
would be socially optimal: ∗  2. This in turn implies that the downstream
firm is able to sell more output for a given network size  than with the optimal
downstream investment level, which counteracts the effect of a higher access
charge  on .
We have not been able to obtain analytically unambiguous results with
respect to the comparison between optimal and 2 levels of , ,  and .
We surmise that the new effect mentioned above mitigates only partially the
direct effects described in section 3, so that the most likely situation is the
one where 2  , ∗  2, ∗  2 2  ∗ and ∗  2 – i.e., where
the relationships between prices and quantities obtained in section 3 carry
through to the case where downstream firms make an investment. We show
in section 6.3 that it is the case for the numerical example we develop there.
Moving to the case with ownership separation (0), observe that, unlike
in previous sections, we can not be assured that the demand that prevails for
downstream firms is increasing in the size of the network (i.e., that e0()  0).
The reason is that a larger network, by decreasing the equilibrium access
charge, reduces the incentives for downstream firms to invest in network-saving
investments (see equation (15)), which means in turns that the firms end
up with more network needs per unit of output, so that the larger network
could accommodate a lower output level once the downstream decisions are
factored in. In the case where e0()  0, we can replicate the argument of
previous sections–namely, that downstream profit is increasing in network
size–to show that the equilibrium network level under ownership separation
is lower than the equilibrium level under legal separation and two subsidiaries:
0  2. It is easy to see that 0  ∗ because, with ownership unbundling,
the only way for the upstream firm to make a profit is to charge an access
price larger than its marginal cost,   .
Finally, the usual argument that the scenario 1 is a convex combination
of the scenarios 0 and 2 results in 1 being intermediate between 0 and 2.
6.3 A numerical example
The new effects generated by the introduction of downstream investments have
prevented us from reaching unambiguous analytical conclusions when compar-
ing equilibrium and optimal levels of prices, network size and output. We
therefore present a numerical example where the comparison of the equilib-
rium levels in the various scenarios is the same as in the previous sections.
We use the following functional forms
() = 2
() = 1−
√
10

() = 100− 5
We first study the case where  is set exogenously equal to zero i.e., the
case developed in section 3. This allows us to show graphically the equilibrium
and optimal levels of the network size  and of output price  as a function of
the marginal network cost . Figure 1 shows that 0  1  2  ∗ while
Figure 2 illustrates that 0  1  2  ∗
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 around here]
We now turn to the case where  is chosen by the downstream firms.
In Table 1, we compare the optimum and equilibrium values of , , ,  and
 when  is set equal to 5.13
Scenarios
∗ 2 1 0
 0.062 0.126 0.283 0.409
 12.552 10.853 8.037 6.345
 17.490 17.830 18.393 18.731
 12.238 10.467 7.609 5.939
 7.103 10.639 12.796
Table 1: Equilibrium levels when  = 5.
Table 1 shows that we obtain the following relationship:   2 
1  0 Intuitively, as the number of downstream firms owned by the up-
stream firm decreases, the upstream firm relies more and more on the access
charge to increase its profit. At the limit, with ownership unbundling (case
0), the access charge is the only way for the upstream firm to obtain rev-
enues. In all scenarios, the equilibrium access charge is larger than its optimal
level. It follows directly from this that we obtain ∗  2  1  0 —i.e.,
the equilibrium level of downstream investment is too large and increases with
ownership separation. The intuition is that downstream firms react to large
13We obtain the same qualitative results for any value of  between 0 and 20.
access charges by over-investing in activities whose objective is to limit their
network usage.
Table 1 also shows that ∗  2  1  0 —i.e., the main result of
the paper carries through to the case of downstream investments: the more
ownership is unbundled, the larger is the incentive for the upstream firm to
decrease its network size in order to raise its profit. We also obtain ∗  2 
1  0 : prices increase with ownership unbundling. Finally, observe that,
even though downstream investment increases with ownership unbundling,
total downstream quantity decreases with ownership unbundling: ∗  2 
1  0 In words, the main effect at work when ownership is unbundled is
the incentive for the upstream firm to decrease its network size. The impact
on the downstream investment mitigates only partially the consequences of
a smaller network size, so that total quantity sold decreases with ownership
unbundling.
7 Conclusion
In all the models that we have developed in this paper, we find that full control
of the downstream industry by the upstream firm would be more efficient than
separation. We obtain this result by assuming throughout the paper that the
regulator has a strong control over the behavior in the downstream market.
In particular, the regulator can completely prevent the network firm from
favoring one of the downstream firms and, in the models of sections 3 and 4,
it can impose on the downstream firms that they behave competitively. On
the other hand, it has less control over the long term decisions of the network,
in our case new investment. Our model stresses the fact that, under these
circumstances, making the upstream firm internalize the profits of its client
can be a powerful method for inducing it to invest more. Even if the upstream
firm owns only one of the two downstream firms, both firms benefit from this
vertical integration.
Our model admittedly concentrates on only one impact of legal un-
bundling. Focusing on the consequences of incomplete contracting together
with specific investment allows us to stress the advantages of legal unbundling.
It is well known that vertical integration also has its costs and may be respon-
sible for inefficiencies. To mention just two examples, there are problems of
incentives within the organization and the vertical integration may facilitate
anti-competitive practices. We are fully aware of these issues and acknowledge
their significance. It is nevertheless our opinion that the effects mentioned in
this paper are relevant and important enough to be of significance when assess-
ing the desirability of legal unbundling. Put differently the issue of investment
incentive ought not to be forgotten in the debate.
To analyze in more details the trade-offs involved in our approach, we
would need to modify the model so that there are positive reasons why compe-
tition in the downstream market is beneficial. This would involve introducing
explicitly some degree of asymmetric information, while preserving our em-
phasis on incomplete contracts and specific investment, and will be the topic
for future research.
Finally let us return to the regulatory environment we consider. The
scenario we have in mind reflects the (maybe utopian) world envisioned by the
European directives where competition in downstream markets (along with
competition policy) replaces to a large extent ex ante regulation. Clearly a
well informed and efficient regulator could undo the problems we point out
in this paper. However, it seems to us that this is not in the spirit of the
projected reforms (at least in the European Union). Specifically, the ownership
unbundling is meant to be part of the process which makes these reforms
possible. In other words, we take a forward view on regulation and study if a
specific organizational structure (along with admittedly minimalist regulation)
provides appropriate incentives for network development. The negative answer
we find means that ownership unbundling would have to be accompanied by
some more stringent form of network size regulation–but then one may debate
if it is the right avenue to deregulation.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
(a) Under legal unbundling when the upstream firm owns both down-
stream firms, firm  chooses  to maximize
 + 1 + 2 = e() −  + (e()) [e()− e()]− 2 µ(e())
2
¶

We reorganize this optimization problem to obtain
max  + 1 + 2 =  −  +() (− )− 2
µ()
2
¶

s. t.  =  0
µ()
2
¶
+ 
() = 
Simplifying and using the inverse demand function yield
 + 1 + 2 =  ()− 2
µ 
2
¶
−  (A1)
Maximizing this expression with respect to  gives the following first-order
condition:
+ 0 =  0
µ 
2
¶
+  (A2)
Equation (A2) is the same condition that we would obtain if we assumed
that the three firms acted as an integrated profit maximizing monopolist and
maximized () − 2(2)− .
(b) (i) Comparing (1) and (A2), we obtain
2  ∗ and 2  ∗
(b) (ii) We now turn to the situation where downstream and upstream
ownerships are separated. When the upstream firm owns neither of the down-
stream firms, it sets the network size in order to maximize its own profits,
 = ˜() − 
Using equations (2) and (3) together with the symmetry between the down-
stream firms, this optimization program can be rewritten as
max  =  − 
s.t.  =  0
µ()
2
¶
+ 
() = 
The two constraints imply
 = ()−  0
µ 
2
¶
which we substitute in  to obtain
 =
∙
 ()−  0
µ 
2
¶¸
 −  (A3)
=
∙
 ()− 2
µ 
2
¶
− 
¸
− 2
∙
 0
µ 
2
¶ 
2
− 
µ 
2
¶¸
 (A4)
Observe that the first term in the right hand side of (A4) corresponds to
 + 1 + 2 as defined in (A1). Because the two downstream firms are price
takers, their downstream prices reflect their marginal costs: per unit of out-
put, they each charge  0(2) to their customers to reflect their costs. The
second bracketed term represents the difference between the resulting revenue
and their true cost. These are profits that the network must abandon to the
downstream firms.
From (A4), we obtain


¯¯¯¯
=2
= − 
2
2
 00
µ 2
2
¶
 0
If the function  is concave, which is the case if the revenue function is
concave and if  000 ≥ 0,14 this implies
0  2  ∗
(b) (iii) We finally look at the intermediate situation where the up-
stream firm owns only one of the two downstream firms. We continue to
assume legal unbundling between the upstream and the downstream firm it
owns. One can proceed as in the previous section to obtain that
 +  =
∙
 ()− 2
µ 
2
¶
− 
¸
−
∙
 0
µ 
2
¶ 
2
− 
µ 
2
¶¸
  = 1 2
Note that this objective function is a convex combination of the objec-
tives in the previous two sections, which are given by (A1) and (A4):
 +  = 1
2
( + 1 + 2) + 1
2
   = 1 2
This in turn gives
0  1  2  ∗
given that the objective functions are concave.15
¤
14Let () = () be the revenue function. From (A3), the second derivative of  with
respect to  is
00()−  00
µ 
2
¶
− 1
2
 000
µ 
2
¶

It is negative if  is concave and both  00 and 000 are positive.
15This is a straightforward consequence of the concavity of the revenue function, and of
the convexity of  and  0 (whose second derivative is 2 00 +  000).
Proof of Proposition 2
(a) Under the scenario 2, the objective of the upstream firm is to find
the network size  that maximizes the sum of the three operators’ profits:
max  + 1 + 2 = [e1() + e2()]e()−  (e1())−  (e2())−  (A5)
The first-order solution of this program is given by
e()[e01() + e02()] + [e1() + e2()]e0()
−  0 (e1()) e01()−  0 (e2()) e02()−  = 0 (A6)
To simplify this expression, we use (8) and
e0() = [e01() + e02()]0(e1() + e2()) (A7)
(1− )e01() + e02() = 1 (A8)
where (A7) and (A8) are obtained by differentiating, respectively, (8) and (6).
We substitute equations (8), (A7) and (A8) in (A6) and we obtain after
simplifications that
(e1() + e2()) + (e1() + e2())0(e1() + e2()) (A9)
=
e01()e01() + e02() 0(e1()) + e
0
2()e01() + e02() 0(e2()) + e01() + e02() 
Note that the factor dividing  i the third term can alternatively be written
as 1 + e01()
This solution differs significantly from that obtained under symmetry
in Section 3. To make this clear, let us compare (A9) with the first-order
condition when the upstream firm is vertically integrated with the two down-
stream firms and has full control over output levels 1 and 2 (there is no legal
unbundling). Denoting this solution by the superscript  , we obtain
( 1 +  2 ) + ( 1 +  2 )0( 1 +  2 ) =  0( 1 ) + (1− ) (A10)
=  0( 2 ) +  (A11)
One can verify that a value of  ensuring that  1 and  2 solve (4) and (5)
exists only if  = 0 (i.e., under symmetry).16
16Combining (4) and (5) with (A10) and (A11) shows that this would require to find 
such that the following two equations hold
( 1 +  2 )0( 1 +  2 ) + (1− ) = (1− )
( 1 +  2 )0( 1 +  2 ) +  = 
which is possible only when  = 0
(b) Observe that productive efficiency is maintained by the fully in-
tegrated firm, since marginal costs are the same at equilibrium for the two
downstream operators. As for legal separation, note that (4) and (5) imply
equal marginal costs only if  =  which is not true in general.
(c) (i) Under ownership separation, the upstream firm maximizes its
own profit, which can be expressed as
 = ( + 1 + 2)− (1 + 2) (A12)
We can also rewrite the profit functions of the two downstream firms as
1 = e1() [e()− (1− )e()]−  (e1()) 
= e1() 0 (e1())−  (e1()) 
2 = e2() [e()− e()]−  (e2()) 
= e2() 0 (e2())−  (e2()) 
Differentiating profits with respect to network size, we then obtain
01 = e1() 00 (e1()) e01()  0
02 = e2() 00 (e2()) e02()  0
Using equation (A12), we show
0(2) =
£0(2) + 01(2) + 02(2)¤− £01(2) + 02(2)¤ 
= 0− £01(2) + 02(2)¤  0
which, by concavity of the function   implies
0  2
(c) (ii) In the 11 scenario, the objective of the upstream operator is to
maximize
 = ( + 1 + 2)− 2 (A13)
which allows us to use the same argument as in the 0 scenario where ownership
is totally unbundled between the upstream and downstream segments. More
precisely, with  given by equation (A13), we obtain that
0(2) = −02  0
and that
0(0) = 01  0
so that, provided that  is concave in , we obtain
0  11  2
Similarly, one can show that
0  12  2
¤
Proof of Proposition 3
(i) Under legal separation with two subsidiaries, the upstream firm
internalizes the downstream profit and solves
max  + 1 + 2 =  −  +() [− − ]
s.t.  = + − 
2
˜0()
() = 
After simplification and using the inverse demand function, we obtain
 + 1 + 2 = (˜()− − ) (A14)
whose maximization with respect to  gives the condition
˜+ ˜0 = +  (A15)
This condition is the usual profit-maximization solution of a monopoly, equal-
izing marginal revenue and marginal cost.
Observe that the second order condition for total (downstream plus
upstream) profit maximization is given by
2˜0 + ˜00  0 (A16)
We will use this result later.
Comparing (9) and (A15), we obtain that 2  ∗ and 2  ∗.
(ii) If ownership is separated between upstream and downstream seg-
ments of the markets, the upstream firm chooses the network size that maxi-
mizes
 = ˜() − 
We can rewrite the optimization problem as
max  =  − 
s.t.  = + − 
2
0()
() = 
We obtain after substitution that
 = [ ()− − ]  + 
2
2
0() (A17)
The first term in the right hand side of (A17) is equal to the total profit
+1+2 as specified by equation (A14) when the upstream firm owns both
downstream firms. This implies


¯¯¯¯
=2
= 2
∙
0(2) + 
2
2
00 ¡2¢¸  0
where the inequality is a consequence of condition (A16). Therefore, by con-
cavity of  ,
0  2
(iii) See the text for the proof that
0  1  2
¤
Proof of Proposition 4
(a) When the upstream firm owns the two downstream firms, it maxi-
mizes the sum of its profit,  and of profits of the two downstream firms, 1
and 2:
 + 1 + 2 =e() −  + (e()) [e()−  (˜())e()]
− 2
µ(e())
2
¶
− ˜() (˜()) 
where ˜() ˜() and ˜() are the solutions to equations (15) to (17).
We reorganize this optimization problem to obtain
max  + 1 + 2 =  −  +() (− ())− 2
µ()
2
¶
− ()
s. t.  =  0
µ()
2
¶
+ () + 
 = ()()
1 = −0()
After simplification, and using the inverse demand function, we obtain
 + 1 + 2 = () ˜ ()− 2
µ 
2()
¶
−  − ()
whose maximization with respect to  gives the following first-order condition
˜() + ˜0() =  0
µ 
2()
¶
+  + () (A18)
where  is determined by
0() = −1
This corresponds to the profit-maximizing condition of a monopoly, where
marginal revenue equals total marginal cost. In order to compare with the
socially optimal price, we denote as usual the equilibrium levels with the 2
superscript and reformulate (A18) into
2 −  0
µ 2
2(2)
¶
= 2 + (2)− 2˜0(2) (A19)
We now compare the right hand sides of (13) and (A19) term by term.
The sum of the first two terms is the (per unit of output) network cost, includ-
ing the investment cost. Note that ∗ + (∗)  2 + (2) if  6= , since
∗ precisely minimizes  + (). This calls for a profit-maximizing price 2
larger than its optimal level, because in the 2 scenario the downstream firms
base their investment decision on the access charge rather than the marginal
social cost , and end up (when  6= ) with a social marginal cost that is
larger than its socially optimal level. The third term in (A19) pushes 2 in
the same direction.
(b) (i) Recall that the objective of the upstream firm with ownership
unbundling can be expressed as
 = ( + 1 + 2)− (1 + 2)
We can also rewrite the profit functions of the two downstream firms as
 = e() [e()−  (˜())e()− ˜()]−  (e()) 
= e() 0 (e())−  (e1()) 
where e() = 
2 (˜()) 
Differentiating profits with respect to network size, we obtain
0 = e1() 00 (e1()) e01()
where e0() = 2 (˜())− 20 () ˜0()42 (˜())
is of an ambiguous sign since 0 ()  0 and ˜0()  0
Observe that, if e0()  0, then we can use the same reasoning as in
section 4 to obtain, provided that the objective function  is concave,
0  2
In that case, we would also have
0  1  2
because the objective in the case 1 is a convex combination of the objectives in
the scenarios 0 and 2, with the same constraints in all three cases. Provided
that the objective is concave, we then obtain that the 1 levels of the variables
, , and  should be in between their equilibrium levels in scenarios 0 and
2.
¤
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Figure 1 : Network size as a function of network cost
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Figure 2 : Output price as a function of network cost
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